Grinding Down the Edges of the Free Expression Right in Hong Kong by Hargreaves, Stuart
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 44
Issue 2 07/01/2019 Article 4
7-1-2019
Grinding Down the Edges of the Free Expression
Right in Hong Kong
Stuart Hargreaves
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, First
Amendment Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and
Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession
Commons, Other Law Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Rule of Law Commons,
and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Stuart Hargreaves, Grinding Down the Edges of the Free Expression Right in Hong Kong, 44 Brook. J. Int'l L. 671 ().
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol44/iss2/4
GRINDING DOWN THE EDGES OF THE





I. OCTS AND THE RISE OF LOCALISM ................................673
II. SPEECH RIGHTS INHONGKONG ..................................677
III. ESTABLISHMENT PUSHBACK AGAINST LOCALISM .........690
IV. IS LOCALISMUNCONSTITUTIONAL?.............................701
V. CAN LOCALIST SPEECH BE BANNED? ...........................704
CONCLUSION .....................................................................712
INTRODUCTION
hough it is axiomatic that free speech is not absolute, in
the liberal-democratic tradition, any limits on speech must
be clear, precise, and subject to justification within the particu-
lar constitutional framework of a given jurisdiction. In the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (“Hong Kong”) of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC), the Court of Final Appeal (CFA)
has developed a line of jurisprudence that explains under which
circumstances the Government of Hong Kong (“the Govern-
ment”) may seek to limit the free speech provisions contained
within the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s quasi-constitution.
1
In its
* BA, JD, BCL, SJD. Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong. stuart.hargreaves@cuhk.edu.hk. The author
wishes to thank the reviewers for their comments and editing, and his consti-
tutional law students in Hong Kong for their discussions regarding the ideas
raised in this article.
1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa (
中華人民共和香港特別行政區基本法) [The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
Presidential Order No. 26, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997) (China) [here-
inafter The Basic Law].
T
672 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
fight against ¶localists,’
2
however, rather than legislating a clear
speech restriction that is consistent with this jurisprudence, the
Government has instead attempted to suppress unwelcome po-
litical speech in a different way, by pushing back against local-
ists across a number of policy domains. The Government, along
with public bodies and other establishment voices, has justified
these actions by claiming that open avocation or perhaps even
mere discussion of localism is itself automatically unconstitu-
tional under the Basic Law. This article argues, however, that
the Basic Law is essentially vertical in its operation, defining the
structure and values of the Region and, from there, its relation-
ship to the citizen. Thus, it is not the people of Hong Kong who
are directly bound by the terms of the Basic Law, but rather the
Government itself. Nonetheless, the Government has advanced
this false narrative to justify a wide-ranging campaign against
localist voices. This article suggests that the Government has
adopted this approach because it foresees losing a constitutional
challenge to legislation that sought to explicitly ban the expres-
sion of localist sentiment in general.
Such a loss would likely provoke a new Interpretation
3
from
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
(NPCSC) that, in turn, would further erode the perception of
Hong Kong’s autonomy within the ¶one country, two systems’
(OCTS) model. This may be why the Government has chosen to
embark upon an ¶extra-legal’ approach to limiting a certain type
of political speech. This method, however, is ultimately counter-
productive because it serves only to reinforce the perception
amongst moderates that the OCTS model may not be as robust
as previously believed, ratcheting up tension where the two sys-
tems intersect. If Beijing wishes for Hong Kongers to perceive
themselves as part of a strong, stable, and rising China, then the
2. The tag of ¶localist’ can be applied to a range of political viewpoints in
Hong Kong, ranging from those who argue that greater respect be given to the
¶two systems’ element of the ¶one country, two systems’ formulation that de-
fines the relationship between Hong Kong and the rest of China, to those who
advocate for increased autonomy for Hong Kong under that same formulation,
and to those who advocate for outright independence for the Region.
3. Under Article 158 of the Basic Law, the NPCSC has the final right of
interpretation over the Basic Law. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 158. For
more, see MICHAEL RAMSDEN & STUART HARGREAVES, THE HONG KONG BASIC
LAW HANDBOOK 483 (2d ed. 2019) [hereinafter THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW
HANDBOOK].
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values delineated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984
4
(“Joint Declaration”) and given effect in the Basic Law cannot be
diluted. Beijing has nothing to fear from Hong Kongers exercis-
ing their political speech rights, even if a minority of that speech
is unwelcome or even unhelpful. Such speech is the inevitable
price of the OCTS model, but for China’s long-term stability and
smooth rise to great-power status, it is very much a price worth
paying. This article begins by offering a brief overview of the
basic constitutional structure of Hong Kong and its relationship
to the rest of China and outlines the rise of ¶localist’ sentiment
in the wake of failed democratic reforms. Part II describes the
constitutional status of speech rights under the Basic Law and
review relevant jurisprudence. Part III describes the ways in
which the Government has sought to suppress localist political
speech in a number of different ways, noting that it justified
those actions by a claim that localism was per se unconstitu-
tional. Part IV argues that this is incorrect as a matter of legal
theory, in that it is the Government that is bound by obligations
under the Basic Law rather individuals. Finally, this article
claims that an effort by the Government to directly legislate a
restriction on localist speech is unlikely to withstand judicial
scrutiny, and its survival would thus depend upon an interven-
tion by the NPCSC under its Article 158 interpretive power.
5
I. OCTS AND THE RISE OF LOCALISM
The Joint Declaration outlined the basic policies
6
intended to
govern Hong Kong following the reestablishment of Chinese sov-
ereignty over the British colony in 1997. That transition would
inevitably pose challenges. For instance, how would a territory
steeped in a largely liberal understanding of the rule of law and
with a robust commitment to capitalism and free markets sit
within a broader system that largely rejected those principles?
During the negotiations that led to the Joint Declaration, Deng
Xiaoping, then the ¶paramount leader’ of the PRC, had advanced
4. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, U.K.²China, Dec. 19, 1984, available at
http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm.
5. See supra note 3.
6. Id. annex I.
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the concept of OCTS as a way to reconcile the distinctive eco-
nomic and legal system of Hong Kong
7
within the overarching
sovereign power of the PRC.
Though OCTS was not explicitly articulated in the Joint Dec-
laration, it was the guiding philosophy and was ultimately en-
shrined in the Preamble to the Basic Law³the quasi-constitu-
tional
8
document that outlines the structure of Hong Kong’s gov-
ernment, the rights of its residents, and the relationship be-
tween the Region and the rest of the PRC:
Upholding national unity and territorial integrity, maintaining
the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and taking account
of its history and realities, the People’s Republic of China has
decided that upon China’s resumption of the exercise of sover-
eignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be established in accordance with the provisions of
Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,
and that under the principle of “one country, two systems,” the
socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong
Kong. The basic policies of the People’s Republic of China re-
garding Hong Kong have been elaborated by the Chinese Gov-
ernment in the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
9
The Basic Law goes on to delineate some critical aspects of the
OCTS model, including that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of
the PRC,
10
that Hong Kong nonetheless enjoys a high degree of
autonomy including independent executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial power,
11
that HongKong’s capitalist system and way of life
is to remain unchanged for fifty years (i.e. 2047),
12
and that the
previous legal system, including the common law and rules of
7. OCTS was also applied to the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty
over Macau. It has also been floated by some within the PRC as a model for
future reincorporation of Taiwan, which the PRC views as a renegade province.
None of the major Taiwanese political parties advocate for OCTS, however,
including those that are pro-unification. See Sean Cooney,Why Taiwan is Not
Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC’s “One Country, Two Systems” Model for Tai-
wan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497 (1997).
8. The Basic Law looks in many ways like a constitution, however it is ul-
timately a national law enacted by the Standing Committee of the PRC.
9. The Basic Law, supra note 1, pmbl.
10. Id. art. 1.
11. Id. arts. 2, 17²19.
12. Id. art. 5.
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equity, are to be maintained in HongKong following the resump-
tion of Chinese sovereignty.
13
At the time of the handover, this
“previous legal system” included not only the common law, but
also the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO),
14
which
had incorporated the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR) into domestic law in 1991. The transfer of
sovereignty did not, therefore, displace the many rights enjoyed
by Hong Kongers; rather, they were further strengthened
thanks to a series of enumerated rights in Chapter III of the
Basic Law and a reiteration in Article 39 that the ICCPR re-
mains in force and must be implemented through domestic
law.
15
Though the OCTS has proven largely successful, it is not with-
out its challenges. This is understandable, given its attempt to
reconcile the sovereignty of an authoritarian state with a civilian
legal tradition, which has within its borders a liberal, quasi-
democratic region wedded to a common law tradition. In partic-
ular, political tensions relating to the pace of Hong Kong’s dem-
ocratic development still remain. Though there are a variety of
recriminations and blame as to the reason for this, parsing them
in detail is beyond the scope of this article.
16
It is important to
note, however, that the tensions in the last few years have
ratcheted up significantly. In 2013, democratic protestors, who
were largely, but not exclusively, secondary and post-secondary
students, blocked major thoroughfares in Hong Kong for several
months in an event known initially as ¶Occupy Central’ and later
13. Id. art. 8.
14. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383 (H.K.).
15. Rights protections may therefore overlap as between the BORO (as the
local implementation of the ICCPR) and the Basic Law, as the content is not
always identical. Chan and Lim have noted that the difference between rights
under the BORO and the Basic Law can be significant when comes to the le-
gitimate restrictions that may be applied and argue that this may lead to stra-
tegic choices in litigation (see Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim, Interpreting Consti-
tutional Rights and Permissible Restrictions, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG
CONSTITUTION 571 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2015).
16. For example, though Article 45 of the Basic Law promises that the “ul-
timate aim” is the election of the Chief Executive by a process of universal
suffrage, twenty years into the history of the SAR, this has still not been
achieved. See generally SIMONM. YOUNG & RICHARD CULLEN, ELECTING HONG
KONG’S CHIEF EXECUTIVE (2010).
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¶the Umbrella Revolution.’
17
The protests sought, in part, to re-
verse a decision
18
by the NPCSC regarding the methodology that
would be used to select the next Chief Executive. Failure to
achieve this goal and a perceived lack of willingness to compro-
mise appears to have hardened attitudes amongst some of the
protestors, leading to the emergence of various strains of what
has been termed localism. These strains include those who de-
mand recognition of what they describe as ¶true’ autonomy for
Hong Kong within the OCTS model, those who seek self-govern-
ance for Hong Kong within the PRC, and a minority for whom
the ultimate goal is Hong Kong’s independence.
Beijing is constantly on guard for perceived threats to its ter-
ritorial integrity; Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang are all are consid-
ered to be issues of critical national security for this reason.
19
The localist movement in Hong Kong was, therefore, destined to
be pounced upon by the Central People’s Government (CPG)
17. The ¶Umbrella Revolution’ was so dubbed after the images of students
using plastic umbrellas to defend themselves against tear-gas wielding police
flashed around the world. For more, see Stuart Hargreaves, From the “Fra-
grant Harbour” to “Occupy Central”: Rule of Law Discourse in Hong Kong’s
Democratic Development 9 J. PARLIAMENTARY& POL. L. 519 (2014).
18. On Aug. 31, 2014, the NPCSC announced that the selection method for
the Chief Executive in 2016 would not be based on universal suffrage and di-
rect election. Instead, a nominating committee would be formed to select two
or three candidates, from whom the population could then choose. The NPCSC
would also retain the power to formally appoint the individual elected through
this process, and that the individual in question would have to “love the coun-
try and love Hong Kong.” See National People’s Congress, Standing Commit-
tee, Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Form-
ing the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in
the Year 2016 (Aug. 31, 2014), available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/fi-
lemanager/template/en/doc/20140831b.pdf [hereinafter Standing Committee
Decision].
19. See generally M. TAYLOR FRAVEL, STRONG BORDERS SECURENATION: CO-
OPERATION & CONFLICT IN CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (2008); William A.
Callahan, National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nation-
alism, 29 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL POL. 199 (2004); Xinbo Wu, Four Con-
tradictions Constraining China’s Foreign Policy Behaviour, 10 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 293 (2001). See Alan M. Wachman, WHY TAIWAN? GEOSTRATEGIC
RATIONALES FORCHINA’STERRITORIAL INTEGRITY (NUS Press 2008); Elliot Sper-
ling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics, 7 POL’Y STUD. 62 (2004);
Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and
Uyghur Discontent, 11 POL’Y STUD. 77 (2004).
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with vigour, at least in part to ensure it could not serve as a bea-
con to other groups that might similarly agitate elsewhere
within the PRC. The CPG described the actions of localists as
“subversive activities” that “damage [China’s] sovereignty and
security.”
20
Though under the “high degree of autonomy”
21
granted to Hong Kong under the Basic Law the Central author-
ities do not govern Hong Kong directly, Beijing retains tremen-
dous influence over the selection process for Chief Executive,
22
ensuring there is little to no daylight between the CPG and the
local Government on key issues. As a result, under both the pre-
vious
23
Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, and the current Chief Ex-
ecutive Carrie Lam, the Hong Kong Government has taken a
hard line against localists of varying stripes. Chan has described
it as a “storm of unprecedented ferocity.”
24
Notably, this has in-
cluded largely treating all localists as a single political bloc, re-
gardless of any positional nuance they may hold in practice.
25
II. SPEECH RIGHTS INHONGKONG
Free expression is a precondition to robust debate and political
change. It helps hold the government accountable. Free expres-
sion aids in the search for truth and allows contribution to the
marketplace of ideas. It also allows the flourishing of art and
literature. In addition, free expression is a contributor to human
dignity.
26
For these reasons, protection for speech is found not
20. Ben Blanchard, China Says Won’t Allow Hong Kong to Be Used as a
Subversion Base, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-hongkong-idUSKBN14M017.
21. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 2.
22. See supra note 16.
23. CY Leung was Chief Executive from 2012 to 2017, serving only a single
term of office.
24. Johannes Chan, A Storm of Unprecedented Ferocity: The Shrinking
Space of the Right to Political Participation, Peaceful Demonstration, and Ju-
dicial Independence in Hong Kong, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373 (2018).
25. This may be shifting slightly. As this author was completing this article,
the Government announced a particular set of measures forbidding the opera-
tion of the Hong Kong National Party, which had clearly advocated for the for-
mation of an independent “Republic of Hong Kong”; these measures have not
been taken against any other localist party. At the time of writing, it was also
unclear whether the ban would be challenged in court.
26. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy & Free Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 251 (2011); ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2d ed. 2005); Guy
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only within the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights
27
but in the
constitutions of virtually all states. Indeed, this holds true across
the political spectrum: authoritarian states pay constitutional
lip service to the value of free speech, even if they fail in practice
to grant their own citizens a mechanism by which to hold the
state accountable for suppressing free speech rights.
28
Yet even
within self-described liberal-democratic states that champion
free speech as a core value and create constitutional mechanisms
that entrench it, in no jurisdiction is free speech considered to be
absolute. In the United States, for example, which is considered
to have one of the most maximalist approaches to speech in the
world, the United States Supreme Court has found that certain
kinds of speech are excluded from the ambit of First Amendment
protection.
29
The nature of limits chosen, however, vary from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction and often reflect the context of local his-
tory or political development.
Notwithstanding the existence of a sovereign with a diametri-
cally opposed view of the rule of law, the importance of an inde-
pendent judiciary, and the value of enforceable human rights,
residents of Hong Kong enjoy a robust, judicially enforced right
to free expression. This right is guaranteed in two separate, but
E. Carmi, Dignity — the Enemy Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Anal-
ysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 J. CONST. L. 957 (2007);
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS (1999).
27. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, art.
19 (Dec. 10, 1948).
28. For instance, Article 35 of the PRC Constitution promises its citizens
“freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and
of demonstration” (XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 35 (1982) (China)); Article 29 of
the Russian Constitution “guarantees freedom of thought and speech”
(KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 29
(Russ.)); Article 67 of the North Korean Constitution “guarantees freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration, and association.” (JOSEON
MINJUJUUI INMIN GONGHWAGUK SAHOEJUUI HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION] art. 67
(N. Kor.)). For more, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Free Speech Without Democracy,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59 (2015).
29. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that defamation (N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), obscenity (Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973)), ¶fighting words’ (Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)), and words intended to incite imminent lawless action (Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) are not protected by the First Amendment guaran-
tee, but almost everything else is. For more, see, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Free-
dom of Expression in the United States: Past and Present, in THE BOUNDARIES
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Thomas R.
Hensley ed., 2001).
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overlapping, ways. First, the BORO guarantees that everyone in
Hong Kong has
the right to hold opinions without interference . . . [and] every-
one shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other me-
dia of his choice.
30
This language is lifted directly from the text of the ICCPR, the
terms of which the Basic Law requires to be implemented
through domestic law.
31
The Basic Law itself goes on to specifi-
cally guarantee that “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom
of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association,
of assembly, of procession and of demonstration.”
32
The CFA pos-
sesses the right and duty to declare any law or action of the Gov-
ernment of no force and effect to the extent it violates any provi-
sion of Basic Law, thereby entrenching these protections.
33
The
BORO predates the Basic Law (and also the creation of the
SAR), but both continue to have relevance forming a “complex
legal matrix of overlapping constitutional rights.”
34
Nonetheless,
in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) v. Ng
Kung Siu,
35
the CFA determined that there was no legally mean-
ingful distinction between the freedom of speech and the free-
dom of expression (as between the Basic Law and the BORO),
and so this article uses the two concepts interchangeably.
Under this framework, the right of expression of HongKongers
has been well-protected.
36
Deeply linked to the rights of assem-
bly and demonstration,
37
it is one which is “of cardinal im-
portance for the stability and progress of society,” and thus,
30. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 14, art. 16 (incor-
porating Art. 22 of the ICCPR).
31. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 39.
32. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 27.
33. See The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 11; see also Ng Ka Ling v. Director
of Immigration, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 4 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling].
34. Simon NM Young, Restricting Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong, 34 H.K.
L.J. 109, 110 (2004).
35. H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Ng Kung Siu, [1999] 2
H.K.C.F.A.R. 442 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter Ng Kung Siu].
36. See THE HONG KONG BASIC LAWHANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 115; Chan
& Lim, supra note 15, at 733.
37. H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Chow Nok Hang, [2013] 16
H.K.C.F.A.R. 837, ¶ 1 (C.F.A.).
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“must be given a generous interpretation . . . [and any] re-
strictions must be narrowly interpreted.”
38
This generous inter-
pretation means protection is afforded not only to speech critical
of government policy,
39
but also to commercial speech uncon-
nected to political issues.
40
The constitutional protection extends
to both verbal and non-verbal
41
communication, and incorpo-
rates the right to be able to both “receive and impart” communi-
cation.
42
Such robust protection for this and other related rights
means that Hong Kongers do not labour under the same kind of
intrusive surveillance and censorship regime
43
as do, for in-
stance, their neighbours in Shenzhen.
44
As in many jurisdictions
that nonetheless value and protect it, however, the speech right
is not absolute.
Ng Kung Siu is the leading case on the restriction of the right
of expression in Hong Kong. The defendants had participated in
a pro-democracy parade, during which they carried two defaced
flags³the national flag and the regional flag³and tied them to
railings outside the Central Government Offices:
Both flags had been extensively defaced. As to the national
flag, a circular portion of the centre had been cut out. Black ink
had been daubed over the large yellow five-pointed star and the
star itself had been punctured. Similar damage appeared on
the reverse side. Further, the Chinese character “shame” had
been written in black ink on the four small stars and on the
reverse side, a black cross had been daubed on the lowest of the
four small stars. As to the regional flag, one section had been
torn off obliterating a portion of the bauhinia design. A black
cross had been drawn across that design. Three of the remain-
ing four red stars had black crosses daubed over them. The Chi-
nese character “shame” was written on the flag in black ink. As
38. Id. ¶¶ 31²32.
39. Sec’y for Justice v. Comm’n of Inquiry Re H.K. Inst. of Educ., [2009] 4
H.K.L.R.D. 11 (C.F.I.).
40. Med. Council of H.K. v. Helen Chan. [2010] 13 H.K.C.F.A.R. 248, ¶ 75
(C.F.A.).
41. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 40.
42. Sec’y for Justice v. Ocean Tech. Ltd., [2009] 1 H.K.C. 271, ¶ 67 (C.F.A.).
43. See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall, 13
MINN. J. L., SCI. & TECH. 125 (2012); Lokman Tsui, The Panopticon as the An-
tithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet in China,
17 CHINA INFO. 65 (2003).
44. Shenzhen is a city of 12 million people on the Hong Kong-PRC mainland
border that is directly accessible via Hong Kong’s subway system.
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was part of a Chinese character which had been rendered illeg-
ible by the tear in the flag. Similar damage appeared on the
reverse side.
45
The defendants were convicted of desecrating the flags. They ap-
pealed on the ground that, inter alia, the relevant laws
46
were
an unconstitutional restriction upon their free expression rights.
It was uncontested that such desecration was a form of non-ver-
bal expression and that the laws prohibiting it were, therefore,
a restriction upon the expression right.
47
Was, however, the re-
striction constitutionally permissible? Li CJ, writing for the ma-
jority, began his analysis with the determination that it was not
relevant whether the restriction was interpreted as one on
speech, as under the Basic Law, or on expression, as under the
BORO: the content of both rights was found to be the same.
48
In
either case, any restriction on a constitutional right had to be
“prescribed by law,” and any such restriction could not contra-
vene the provisions of the ICCPR.
49
The Hong Kong courts
50
have interpreted the ¶prescribed by
law’ requirement as incorporating the ¶proportionality test’ fa-
miliar to the constitutional jurisprudence of various common law
jurisdictions. This test is typically phrased as something ap-
proaching the following: for a restriction on a constitutional
right to be upheld, it must first be shown to be prescribed by law
(also described as the requirement of legality). This means any
restriction must be clear and readily ascertainable by a member
of the public and based upon a legitimate source. From there,
the question then shifts to that of necessity, which is composed
of several sub-requirements. First, is the restriction in the ser-
vice of a legitimate objective? Second, is there a rational connec-
tion between the restriction and that objective? In other words,
45. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶¶ 25²26.
46. National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance, (1997) Instrument
A401, § 7 (H.K.); Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance, (1997) In-
strument A602, § 7 (H.K.).
47. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 40.
48. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 42.
49. Id. (citing The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 39).
50. Chan & Lim, supra note 15, at 597.
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does the former actually further the latter? Finally, is the re-
striction proportional³that is, does it impair the right no more
51
than is necessary in order to achieve the objective?
52
Though the structure adopted in Ng Kung Sui³an early point
in the CFA’s proportionality jurisprudence³contains elements
of this approach, it was conceptually collapsed by Li CJ as fol-
lows. First, is there a legitimate reason for the restriction?
53
If
so, is the restriction necessary to meet that reason?
54
Though the
second stage did consider the issue of proportionality, it did so
in a manner lacking the nuance and precision afforded by the
full test adopted in later rights-based jurisprudence.
Li CJ found that the ICCPR was exhaustive of the ¶legitimate
aims’ of a restriction on the speech right:
[The right of free expression] may therefore be subject to cer-
tain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (or-
dre public), or of public health or morals.
55
From these, the Government had argued that the primary justi-
fication for the restriction was the maintenance of public order
(ordre public).
56
In considering this submission, Li CJ first
sought to determine the ambit of the ¶ordre public’ aspect of this
51. This ¶minimal impairment’ idea does not mean, however, that the Gov-
ernment has necessarily chosen the least impairing restriction to achieve the
objective; the courts offer a margin of discretion to choose from various options
providing it can show it is impairing the right as little as reasonably possible.
52. Though the concept is the same, the exact contours of the proportionality
test have shifted slightly recently. See, e.g., Hysan Development Co. Ltd. v.
Town Planning Board, [2016] 19 H.K.C.F.A.R. 372 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter Hysan
Development Co. Ltd.], in which the CFA adopts a fourth step into the propor-
tionality analysis: a balance of the detrimental and salutary impacts of the
decision on society overall must also be considered (but only if the first three
steps are met). Though this step was adopted into Canadian law more than 30
years ago (see R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)), it is now also found in
the English jurisprudence (see, e.g., R (Quila) v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t [2012] 1 AC 621), which may explain the Court’s decision to adopt it re-
cently.
53. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 45.
54. Id. ¶ 56.
55. Id. ¶ 45 (citing ICCPR, Art. 19(3)).
56. Id. ¶ 47.
2019] The Free Expression Right in Hong Kong 683
concept. He concluded its inclusion indicated a much wider con-
cept than simply “law and order,” incorporating the “general
welfare or« interests of the collectivity as a whole.”
57
This was
determined in large³though not exclusive
58
³part by reference
to the Siracusa Principles
59
on derogation from the ICCPR:
22. The expression “public order (ordre public)” as used in the
Covenant may be defined as the sum of rules which ensure the
functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on
which society is founded. Respect for human rights is part of
public order (ordre public).
23. Public order (ordre public) shall be interpreted in the con-
text of the purpose of the particular human right which is lim-
ited on this ground.
24. State organs or agents responsible for the maintenance of
public order (ordre public) shall be subject to controls in the
exercise of their power through the parliament, courts, or other
competent independent bodies.
60
The Chief Justice then noted that despite this generally wide
ambit, what is understood as ordre public nonetheless must re-
main a “function of time, place, and circumstances,”
61
drawing
from Wong Yeung Ng v. Secretary of Justice.
62
In Wong Yeung
Ng, the Court of Appeal had held that the administration of jus-
tice³specifically, a charge for contempt of court for harassing
57. Id. ¶¶ 49, 54.
58. The Court also considered an advisory opinion on the American Conven-
tion of Human Rights, which also referred to the concept in the same manner.
See The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6 (May 9,
1986).
59. The Siracusa Principles were developed in 1984 following a conference
of human rights, penal, and international law experts seeking to clarify the
interpretation and application of the limitation and restriction clauses con-
tained in the text of the ICCPR. Though the principles are not directly binding,
they were considered to represent the general state of international law in this
area at the time they were written. Thus, they provide a useful guide for courts
seeking to interpret the application of the ICCPR to their domestic laws.
60. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, The Siracusa
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 22²24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4
(Sept. 28, 1984), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4672bc122.htm
(cited in Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 52).
61. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 54.
62. Wong Yeung Ng v. Sec’y for Justice, [1999] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 293 (C.A.).
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and publishing abusive articles about a member of the judici-
ary³fell within the concept of public order.
63
The Court deter-
mined that whether or not the administration of justice had been
harmed necessarily turned on “local circumstances.”
64
The dif-
fering constitutional and social structures of the United King-
dom, the United States, and Canada meant that similar cases in
those jurisdictions held little persuasive value for the Court in
answering such questions.
65
With this understanding of public order (ordre public) in hand,
Li CJ then turned to whether the state’s interest in protecting
its symbols
66
fit within it. In answering in the affirmative, the
Chief Justice placed particular emphasis on Hong Kong’s new
constitutional order: the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over
Hong Kong, thereby “fulfilling the long-cherished common aspi-
ration of the Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong.”
67
This was the relevant ¶time, place, and circumstance’: a recent
constitutional transformation meant there were “legitimate so-
cietal interests” in protecting the national and regional flags and
emblems as they were “part of the general welfare and the inter-
ests of the collectivity as a whole.”
68
That, of course, was not the
end of the analysis; having determined (in the current parlance)
that the restriction was in the furtherance of a “legitimate aim,”
it remained to be determined whether or not the restriction was
in fact necessary to achieve that aim.
In Li CJ’s formulation, this was essentially the question of pro-
portionality. “Essentially,” insofar as the Chief Justice began his
analysis by arguing that in determining necessity, it was im-
portant to give due weight to the decision of the Legislative
Council to enact the relevant Ordinances.
69
On the one hand, the
Legislative Council was required to enact the Ordinance related
to the national flag.
70
On the other, it had chosen to enact the
63. Id. ¶ 34.
64. Id. ¶ 48.
65. Id. ¶¶ 48²50.
66. The Court noted that the assertion of this interest had been unchal-
lenged. See Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 8.
67. Id. ¶ 55 (citing The Basic Law, supra note 1, pmbl.).
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 59.
70. National PRC laws do not apply in Hong Kong unless they are added to
Annex III of the Basic Law by the NPCSC and then promulgated locally; the
law relating to the protection of the national flag is one such law.
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Ordinance related to the regional flag. Legislative decision-mak-
ing, required or otherwise, however, seems like a thin ground for
establishing ¶necessity.’ Indeed, it is axiomatic that the Legisla-
tive Council would have believed it had good reason to enact a
law, so this alone cannot speak meaningfully to the question of
necessity. In any event, the bulk of the necessity question in Ng
Kung Siu still turned³as it should have³upon the issue of pro-
portionality: were the restrictions on expression contained in the
impugned Ordinances proportional to the “unquestionably legit-
imate societal and community interests” in the protection of im-
portant community symbols?
71
Li CJ concluded that they were, but his analysis was rather
brief and represent an approach to proportionality that is prob-
lematic. On the question of ¶necessity,’ the Chief Justice argued
that “having regard to what is only a limited restriction on the
right to the freedom of expression, the test of necessity is satis-
fied.”
72
This lacks intellectual rigor. It not only appears to sug-
gest that anything less than a complete elimination of the right
will meet the necessity requirement, but it also conflates the
need for a restriction on a right with the mechanism by which
that need is met. This problem is further revealed by the Chief
Justice’s attempt to buttress his analysis by referring to the im-
mediate political context:
The limited restriction is proportionate to the aims sought to
be achieved and does not go beyond what is proportionate. . . .
The implementation of the principle of “one country, two sys-
tems” is a matter of fundamental importance, as is the rein-
forcement of national unity and territorial integrity. Protection
of the national flag and the regional flag from desecration, hav-
ing regard to their unique symbolism, will play an important
part in the attainment of these goals. In these circumstances,
there are strong grounds for concluding that the criminalisa-
tion of flag desecration is a justifiable restriction on the guar-
anteed right to the freedom of expression.
73
Respectfully, the question of political context should only be rel-
evant in determining the legitimacy of the aims of a given re-
striction, not the justifiability of the particular means selected
to achieve that aim. Li CJ uses the immediate political context
71. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 60.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 61.
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to not only establish the legitimacy of the restrictions by finding
they served ordre public, but then also uses it, at least in part,
to judge proportionality. In theory this approach could allow po-
litical necessity to bootstrap the constitutionality of virtually
any law; the majority opinion in Ng Kung Siu seems to collapse
a complicated legal analysis about proportionality into a ques-
tion only of ¶does the restriction on a constitutional right serve
an apparent need at this moment in time?’
The difficulty and/or danger of this approach may also explain
Bokhary PJ’s decision in Ng Kung Siu to issue a separate con-
currence. He (properly) focused the proportionality question on
the narrowness of the restriction at issue, foreshadowing what
would later be described as the ¶minimal impairment’ step of jus-
tifying rights restrictions.
74
He argued that only a narrow re-
striction on a constitutional right could be reconcilable with the
purpose of the right.
75
In determining ¶narrowness,’ Bokhary PJ
noted that a law could either attempt to restrict the substance of
an expression³the content of a message³or the mode of an ex-
pression, or how the message is conveyed. Laws that attempt to
restrict only the mode of expression are necessarily narrower
than those that seek to limit substance. He approvingly noted
that the impugned Ordinances in Ng Kung Siu focused only
upon a particular mode of expression, defacing or otherwise
damaging the national and regional flags:
[The laws in question] place no restriction at all on what people
may express. Even in regard to how people may express them-
selves, the only restriction placed is against the desecration of
objects which hardly anyone would dream of desecrating even
if there was no law against it. No idea would be suppressed by
the restriction. Neither political outspokenness nor any other
form of outspokenness would be inhibited.
76
For Bokhary PJ, the Ordinances were narrowly targeted at pro-
tecting important societal symbols rather than broadly limiting
critical speech, and so could be reconciled with the overall guar-
antees of free expression in the Basic Law and the BORO. It
would, he suggested, be hard to imagine broad limitations on the
content of the speech rights of Hong Kongers: “All persons in
74. Leung Kwok Hung v. H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR), [2005] 8
H.K.C.F.A.R. 229, ¶ 36 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter Leung Kwok Hung].
75. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 95.
76. Id. ¶ 97.
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Hong Kong are³and can be confident that they will remain³
equally free under our law to express their views on all matters
whether political or non-political: saying what they like, how
they like.”
77
This approach to the proportionality question and
the issue of mode versus substance is conceptually far more sat-
isfying and helps ensure that, as Chan and Lim note, the princi-
ples of legality and proportionality are better retained as sepa-
rate concepts.
78
This may explain why in HKSAR v. Koo Sze Yiu,
79
though the
CFA declined to revisit the constitutionality of the Ordinances
at issue inNg Kung Siu, it nonetheless chose to offer a relatively
detailed explanation of its decision to decline leave to appeal.
Most notably, Ma CJ offered his own gloss on the majority opin-
ion inNg Kung Siu, clarifying this issue of context. He suggested
that the issue of “¶time, place, and circumstances’ is [only] a ref-
erence to a part of the legal test to determine whether or not the
concept of public order (ordre public) applies.”
80
Nonetheless, Ng
Kung Siu remains good law and along with Koo Sze Yiu stands
for the proposition that restrictions on the political speech rights
of Hong Kongers can pass constitutional muster in certain cir-
cumstances.
81
Subsequent jurisprudence, however, more closely
tracks Bokhary PJ’s analytical approach: that is, answering the
proportionality question primarily by interrogating the narrow-
ness of the restriction imposed upon the right. This approach
highlights the importance of the substance versus mode re-
striction. In Kwok Hay Kwong, for instance, the court deemed a
total ban on medical practitioners from advertising their ser-
vices to be an unjustifiable restriction on their expression rights,
even though there was a legitimate aim to the law³preventing
misleading medical advertisements.
82
By contrast, in Medical
Council of Hong Kong v. Helen Chan, a professional code that
77. Id. ¶ 98.
78. Chan & Lim, supra note 15, at 596.
79. H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Koo Sze Yiu, [2014] 17
H.K.C.F.A.R. 811 (C.F.A.).
80. Id. ¶ 12.
81. Yap has suggested there was also a political element at play the Court’s
decision in Ng Kung Siu, in that it was likely reluctant to come to a finding
that a national law effectively breached the Basic Law. See Po Jen Yap, Con-
stitutional Review Under the Basic Law: The Rise, Retreat, & Resurgence of
Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 37 H.K. L.J. 449, 459 (2007).
82. Kwok Hay Kwong v. Med. Council of H.K., [2008] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 524
(C.A.).
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prevented medical professionals from publicly or commercially
endorsing medical products or services was upheld as a justifia-
ble restriction on their expression rights, in part because it did
not seek to prevent medical professionals from offering such
commentary in other, non-commercial contexts.
83
In Secretary
for Justice v. Ocean Technology Ltd., a requirement to obtain a
broadcasting license from Government was upheld in part be-
cause it was not tied to the content of any subsequent expressive
use to which the license would be put; it was a proportional re-
quirement given the need to allocate limited broadcast spec-
trum.
84
In Cho Man Kit v. Broadcasting Authority, though not consid-
ering the constitutionality of a specific law and thus not dealing
with the question of proportionality, the court took a dim view of
an apparent attempt to regulate television programming on the
basis of content.
85
The Broadcasting Authority had issued an of-
ficial “admonition” to the broadcaster, RTHK, regarding a tele-
vision programme that dealt with the lives and challenges faced
by gays and lesbians in Hong Kong. The admonition claimed
that the programme was “biased” in favour of homosexuality,
meaning RTHK had failed to fulfill its obligation of impartiality
under the relevant Codes.
86
The court found that this was “an
impermissible restriction on the freedom of speech, a restriction
founded materially on a discriminatory factor.”
87
Hartmann J.
(as he then was) cited European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR) jurisprudence to support his contention that the free
speech right must apply not only to popular ideas, but also “those
83. Med. Council of H.K. v. Helen Chan, [2010] 13 H.K.C.F.A.R. 248, ¶ 81
(C.F.A.).
84. Sec’y for Justice v. Ocean Tech. Ltd., [2009] 1 H.K.C. 271, ¶¶ 130²34
(C.F.A.).
85. Cho Man Kit v. Broad. Auth., [2008] H.K.C. 383 (C.F.I.) [hereinafter Cho
Man Kit].
86. The Generic Codes of Practice for Television are issued under the au-
thority of the Broadcasting Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 562 (H.K.), and include
standards related to programming content, advertising, and technical issues.
They are updated regularly; for the current version, see Policies & Regulations:
Television, COMM. AUTH., https://www.coms-auth.hk/mobile/en/policies_regu-
lations/cop_guidelines/broadcasting/television/index.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2019).
87. Cho Man Kit, supra note 85, ¶ 91.
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that offend, shock, or disturb.”
88
Meanwhile in Chee Fei Ming v.
Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene, a requirement to
seek permission from a Government department before posting
signs on public land was found to be a proportional restriction
given the legitimate aim of preserving the cityscape; no evidence
was introduced to show that the Government applied a content-
based analysis when deciding to grant permission or not, and
there were no restrictions on communicating the intended mes-
sage in other ways.
89
All these cases indicate that while the
courts of Hong Kong may be willing to accept certain limits on
speech where the focus is purely on the mode of expression, they
are far more skeptical of broad efforts to limit the substance of
speech.
Hong Kong does shade closer to the latter in a few isolated cat-
egories, however. Take, for instance, the prohibition on the dis-
play, distribution, or publication (or importation for the pur-
poses thereof) of ¶obscene’ materials.
90
The Control of Obscene
and Indecent Articles Ordinance (COIAO) defines “obscenity” in
a rather circular manner, in that a “thing is obscene if by reason
of obscenity is not suitable to be published to any person.”
91
In
turn, suitability is to be determined by a Tribunal having regard
to the “standards of morality, decency, and propriety that are
generally accepted by reasonable members of the community.”
92
Though this might seem ripe for a constitutional challenge and
while scholars have raised concerns about a number of classifi-
cation decisions reached by the Tribunal,
93
no such challenge has
yet been brought. In common with a number of liberal-demo-
cratic jurisdictions,
94
Hong Kong also criminalizes hate speech.
88. Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 418 (1986), cited in Cho Man
Kit, supra note 85, ¶ 6.
89. Chee Fei Ming v. Dir. of Food and Envtl. Hygiene, [2014] 5 H.K.L.R.D.
771, ¶139 (C.A.).
90. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance, (1987) Cap.
390 (H.K.).
91. Id. § 2(2).
92. Id. § 10(1).
93. See Po Jen Yap, Freedom of Expression, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG
CONSTITUTION (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2011) 746²47; Johannes
Chan, Freedom of the Press: The First Ten Years of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region, 15 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 163, 182 (2007).
94. Canada, for instance, prohibits the “[willfull] promo[tion] of hatred
against any identifiable group” (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 (Can.)).
690 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
The Race Discrimination Ordinance (RDO) makes it an offense
to “incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule
of, another or members of a class of persons” on the ground of
their race or membership in a particular class.
95
This law has
also never been challenged in court, though one would anticipate
it would withstand judicial scrutiny under the proportionality
jurisprudence³narrowly defined, there is no ¶benefit’ to the in-
citement of hatred in a pluralistic society and a good deal of po-
tential harm, including violence. But even the speech-restrictive
provisions of the COIAO and RDO are not purely substance-
based. The prohibition under the COIAO is limited to the publi-
cation or public display
96
of obscene materials (or importation for
the purposes thereof), while the RDO applies only prohibits cer-
tain kinds of activities in public.
97
Neither, then, is a blanket
prohibition on the substance of certain expressive content. Hong
Kongers remain free to express racist opinions in private and to
enjoy a wide range of material some might deem obscene in the
comfort of their homes.
III. ESTABLISHMENT PUSHBACK AGAINST LOCALISM
This jurisprudential backgroundmay explain why the Govern-
ment has seemingly chosen to pursue a series of non-legislative
methods to combat localist speech, and it is in this way that the
Likewise in France, the Penal Code prohibits speech intended to “provoke dis-
crimination, hate, or violence towards a person«” because of their ethnic, na-
tional, racial, or religious identity (Code Pénal [C. Pén.] [Penal Code] art.
R625²7 (Fr.), available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArti-
cle.do?idArti-
cle=LEGIARTI000022376044&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719). So too, in
Germany, the Criminal Code forbids inciting hatred against identifiable parts
of the population or to insult them in a manner contrary to their human dignity
(Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], §130 (Ger.)). In India, the Penal Code
forbids speech that promotes “disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-
will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities” (Indian Penal Code, PEN. CODE, § 153A (India)). In New Zea-
land, the Human Rights Act forbids speech that is “likely to excite hostility
against or bring into contempt any group of persons . . . on the ground of [their]
colour, race, or ethnic or national or ethnic origin” (Human Rights Act of 1993,
s. 61 (N.Z.)). This is not an exhaustive list, of course, but simply serves to
demonstrate that the idea of regulating such speech is not uncommon.
95. Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.).
96. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance, supra note 90,
§§ 21²22.
97. Race Discrimination Ordinance, supra note 95, §§ 45(1), 46(1)(c) (H.K.).
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edges of the (political) speech right in Hong Kong are being
ground down. The Government first began by seeking to deny
localist politicians the right to sit in the Legislative Council, ei-
ther pre-emptively or ex post facto. Though Hong Kong residents
cannot vote directly for their Chief Executive, they can do so for
half of the seats in the Legislative Council. In the 2016 elections
for those seats, a number of candidates put themselves forward
on what could be described as a ¶localist’ platform. Immediately,
the Government sought to block a number of them from running
at all. The Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC) instituted a new
requirement that all candidates for office sign a “confirmation
form” that included a declaration that they would uphold the
Basic Law and that they pledged allegiance to the Hong Kong
SAR.
98
Chan Ho-tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party,
declined to sign the form and was disqualified,
99
as was Yeung
Ke-cheong of the Democratic Progressive Party.
100
Edward
Leung of Hong Kong Indigenous signed the form, but was none-
theless disqualified after the Returning Officer did not believe
him to be sincere.
101
A challenge to the declaration requirement
was filed in May 2017³long after the election had actually oc-
curred. The Court of First Instance found that the requirement
was legitimate, but required that a Returning Officer should
only question the validity of the Declaration if there was “cogent,
clear, and compelling evidence which plainly shows objectively
that the candidate, notwithstanding the signed Declaration,
98. Press Release, H.K. Electoral Affairs Comm’n, EAC’s Request to Sign
Confirmation Form Has Legal Basis (July 19, 2016), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201607/19/P2016071900950p.htm; though
this form was new, the Legislative Council Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 542, § 40
(H.K.) had always held that the Electoral Affairs Commission could reject the
candidacy of someone who did not make such a declaration.
99. Emily Tsang & Elizabeth Cheung, Hong Kong National Party Convenor
Disqualified From Running in Legislative Council Polls, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (July 30, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/arti-
cle/1996994/hong-kong-national-party-convenor-disqualified-running.
100. Jeffie Lam, “I Was Disqualified”: Second Hong Kong Localist Candidate
Barred From Running in Legco Elections, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 31,
2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1997371/i-was-
disqualified-second-hong-kong-localist-candidate.
101. Joyce Ng et al., Protests Shut Down Electoral Commission Briefing as
Hong Kong Indigenous’ Edward Leung Disqualified from Legco Elections, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/politics/article/1998201/hong-kong-indigenous-edward-leung-disquali-
fied-legislative.
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does not have the intention . . . to uphold the Basic Law and
swear allegiance to the HKSAR. [Fairness] requires that gener-
ally the Returning Officer should give a reasonable opportunity
to the candidate to respond.”
102
The Government defended all the disqualifications by arguing
that the positions of the candidates were incompatible with the
duties of a legislator to uphold the Basic Law. There was, it said,
“no question of any political censorship, restriction of the free-
dom of speech, or deprivation of the right to stand for elec-
tions.”
103
In total, six localist candidates were disqualified from
running, with a number of others left in limbo until shortly be-
fore the election.
104
Nonetheless, three overtly localist candidate
won seats: Yau Wai-ching and Sixtus Leung Chung-hang of
Youngspiration, and Nathan Law Kwun-chung of Demosistż.
These electoral victories triggered the second stage of legal ac-
tions against localist politicians.
Before councillors can formally take their seats, they are re-
quired to take the following oath:
I swear that, being a member of the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Re-
public of China, I will uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China, bear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region of the People’s Republic of China and serve the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conscientiously, du-
tifully, in full accordance with the law, honestly and with in-
tegrity.
105
The basis for the oath requirement may be found Article 104 of
the Basic Law, but it is subsidiary legislation that provides the
actual text of the oath and the rules for how and when it is to be
102. Chan Ho Tin v. Lo Ying-ki Alan, [2018] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 7, ¶ 80 (C.F.I.).
103. Press Release, H.K. Special Admin. Region, HKSAR Government Re-
sponds to Media Enquiries Regarding 2016 Legislative Council Election, (July
30, 2016), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gen-
eral/201607/30/P2016073000700.htm.
104. Joyce Ng, Two Radical Hong Kong Localists Await Their Fate While a
Third Legco Candidate is Banned, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1997860/two-radical-
hong-kong-localists-await-their-fate-while-third.
105. Oaths & Declarations Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 11, pt. IV (H.K.).
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taken.
106
During the oath-taking ceremony, a number of council-
lors appeared to violate the guidance provided in the relevant
Ordinance. The two Youngspiration candidates declared their
allegiance to the Hong Kong “nation” rather than the “SAR,” in-
tentionally mispronounced “China” in a derogatory way, and
held flags with localist slogans.
107
Both were offered a second op-
portunity to read the oath correctly, which they initially de-
clined.
108
Nathan Law also mispronounced “China” and then de-
scribed the requirement as a “political tool.”
109
He, too, refused
to retake the oath.
110
Lau Siu-lai, an independent candidate as-
sociated with the pan-democrats, but not a member of a localist
party, read an incorrect version of the oath.
111
She was offered
and took a second opportunity to retake the oath, during which
she read the correct version, but extremely slowly, taking over
ten minutes.
112
Edward Yiu Chung-yim, also a pan-democrat,
but not belonging to a localist party, added the phrase “for de-
mocracy and for Hong Kong’s sustainable development” to his
oath, and refused to retake it.
113
Leung Kwok-hung, a long-time
activist known as “Long Hair,” held a yellow umbrella during his
reciting of the oath, the text of which he reordered while reading,
and tore up a prop he said represented the earlier Decision
114
of
the CPG regarding election methodology. A number of other
councillors read the oath correctly, but then added extra state-
ments at the end or carried props.
115
The relevant Ordinance holds that a candidate who “declines
or neglects” to take the oath shall be required to vacate the office
if he or she has already entered it, or be disqualified from the
106. Id. § 19.
107. Ellie Ng, Democratic Lawmakers Stage Protests and Alter Oaths as New
Term Kicks Off at Hong Kong Legislature, H.K. FREE PRESS (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/12/breaking-democratic-lawmakers-
stage-protests-alter-oaths-new-term-kicks-off-hong-kong-legislature/ [herein-







114. Standing Committee Decision, supra note 18.
115. Ng, Democratic Lawmakers Stage Protests, supra note 107.
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office if it has not yet been entered.
116
The President of the Leg-
islative Council indicated he was prepared to allow the candi-
dates who had failed to take the oath correctly another chance
to do so if they applied in writing,
117
and a number did so.
118
Sensing an opportunity to bat down the localist cause, however,
the Government sought a judicial review of the President’s deci-
sion, arguing he did not have the right to allow re-taking of the
oaths.
119
As the case was working its way through the local court
system, the intense scrutiny of the CPG became apparent.
Though Hong Kong’s legal system is autonomous under the
OCTS formulation, the final right of interpretation of the Basic
Law belongs neither to its highest court nor to the Government
of the Region. Instead, Article 158 deems that it belongs to the
NPCSC, a political rather than judicial body located in the main-
land. The text of Article 158,
120
however, also provides that the
116. Oaths and Declarations Ordinance, supra note 105, § 21.
117. Stanley Leung, Lawmaker Who Took 10-Mins to Deliver ‘Slow Motion’
LegCo Oath Among Several Told to Repeat Pledge, H.K. FREE PRESS (Oct. 18,
2016), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/18/lawmaker-who-took-10-mins-
to-deliver-slow-motion-legco-oath-among-several-told-to-repeat-pledge/.
118. Ellie Ng, Youngspiration DuoMake Requests to Retake LegCo Oaths Fol-
lowing Wording Controversy, H.K. FREE PRESS (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/18/youngspiration-duo-make-requests-
to-retake-legco-oath-after-swearing-in-controversy/.
119. Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. President of
the Legislative Council, [2016] HCAL 185/2016, ¶ 130 (C.F.I.).
120. The full text of Art. 158 reads:
The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall
authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases,
the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the
autonomy of the Region. The courts of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of
this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the
Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions
of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of
the Central People’s Government, or concerning the relation-
ship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if
such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases,
the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judg-
ments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the
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CFA may interpret the Basic Law in areas that are within the
Region’s competency. For those areas outside its competency,
the CFA is required to approach the NPCSC for an Interpreta-
tion. Some of the most significant CFA jurisprudence deals with
how this provision is to operate and, in particular, how to resolve
disputes about what is and what is not within the Region’s com-
petency.
121
Though that jurisprudence has concluded
122
that the
NPCSC retains a plenary right to interpret any provision within
the Basic Law, any dispute as to whether a particular provision
is within the competency of the Region or not can highlight fric-
tion in how the ¶two systems’ interact.
Prior to the oath-taking issue, the NPCSC’s most controversial
use of the interpretive power had come in 1999. In Ng Ka Ling,
the CFA concluded that it did not need to seek assistance from
the NPCSC in interpreting a provision of the Basic Law related
to who had the ¶right of abode’ (a kind of permanent residency)
in Hong Kong, arguing that such a matter fell within the compe-
tency of the Region under the OCTS model.
123
Following a re-
quest from the Government (a power not found within the text
of the Basic Law), the NPCSC issued an Interpretation
124
in or-
der to obtain the political result desired. So controversial was
relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of
the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an inter-
pretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Re-
gion, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpre-
tation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments pre-
viously rendered shall not be affected. The Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress shall consult its Com-
mittee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law.
The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 158.
121. See THEHONGKONGBASIC LAWHANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 483.
122. See Lau Kong Yung v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300
(CFA); Vallejos Evangeline B. v Commissioner of Registration, [2013] 2
HKLRD 533 (CFA).
123. Ng Ka Ling, supra note 33.
124. National People’s Congress, Standing Committee, The Interpretation by
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Articles 22(4)
and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People’s Republic of China (June 26, 1999), available at http://www.basi-
claw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc17.pdf.
696 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
this decision that it was later revealed that the entire Court con-
sidered resigning in protest.
125
Perhaps wary of triggering fur-
ther controversy, between 2000 and 2015, the NPCSC appeared
more restrained in its use of the interpretive power.
126
That re-
straint vanished, however, in the face of localism, an indication
of how seriously Beijing takes the issue. Before the lower court
had even reached a decision on the merits of the oaths case (let
alone waiting for the case to work its way up the appellate
chain), the NPCSC issued an Interpretation of Article 104.
127
To
reiterate, the NPCSC did not and could not offer an interpreta-
tion of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance, but only of the
related Basic Law provision itself. The Interpretation was ex-
pansive, noting that the correct understanding of Article 104
was that the candidates had to take the oath seriously and cor-
rectly, and any errors could not be subsequently fixed:
An oath taker must take the oath sincerely and solemnly, and
must accurately, completely and solemnly read out the oath
prescribed by law. . . . An oath taker who intentionally reads
out words which do not accord with the wording of the oath
prescribed by law, or takes the oath in a manner which is not
sincere or not solemn, shall be treated as declining to take the
oath. The oath so taken is invalid and the oath taker is disqual-
ified forthwith from assuming the public office specified in the
Article. . . . If the oath taken is determined as invalid, no ar-
rangement shall be made for retaking the oath.
128
125. See Kemal Bokhary, All City’s Top Judges “Considered Quitting”, S.
CHINAMORNINGPOST (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.scmp.com/article/978391/all-
citys-top-judges-considered-quitting.
126. The NPCSC issued only three Interpretations over a fifteen-year period.
One dealt with the meaning of whether the phrase “subsequent to 2007” in-
cluded 2007, one dealt with the effects of a failure of the Chief Executive to
complete a full term on the length of the term of their successor, and one re-
lated to whether or not Hong Kong adhered to the concept of restrictive or ab-
solute state immunity. Only the last of these related to a case in the local court
system, and in it the CFA had determined the relevant provisions of the Basic
Law to be interpreted were within the competency of the NPCSC and duly ap-
proached it with the request for an Interpretation (see Democratic Republic of
Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assoc. LLC, [2011] H.K.C.F.A.R. 95, 165 (C.F.A.)).
127. National People’s Congress, Standing Committee, Interpretation of Ar-
ticle 104 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People’s Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress (Nov. 7, 2016), available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basi-
clawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc25.pdf.
128. Id. at 2.
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This technique of constitutional interpretation³essentially a
legislative inclusion into the Basic Law of an entirely new clause
that alters a piece of subsidiary legislation³is very different to
the kind of “reading in” interpretive technique familiar to com-
mon law constitutional jurisprudence. It is, however, uncontro-
versial and common within the PRC legal system.
129
Since the
local courts were legally obligated to follow the Interpretation,
this ensured the Government’s action would succeed and the two
Youngspiration candidates were duly barred from office.
130
In
finding for the Government, however, Justice Au contended that
he would have come to the same conclusion even in the absence
of the Interpretation, arguing that “independent of the Interpre-
tation, the laws of Hong Kong as set out in the relevant provi-
sions [of the] Oaths & Declarations Ordinance, when properly
construed, indeed carry effectively the same meanings and legal
effects [as the Interpretation].”
131
The Court of Appeal took the
approach that the Interpretation had independent effect and
served to disqualify Leung and Yau, while the Ordinance re-
quired them to then vacate their offices upon disqualification.
132
The purpose of Article 104, according to Cheung CHJC writing
for a unanimous panel, was to make taking the oath genuinely,
solemnly, and sincerely a “prerequisite and precondition to the
assumption of office” and the Interpretation put any question
over this “beyond doubt.”
133
In rejecting leave to further appeal,
the CFA noted that the Interpretation declared what the law “is
and always has been” since the Basic Law came into effect, and
consequently, that it was dispositive.
134
129. See for instance Sophia Woodman, Legislative Interpretation by China’s
National People’s Congress Standing Committee: A Power with Roots in the
Stalinist Conception of Law, in INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE
STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE 229, 229²41 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2007); Paul
Gewirtz, Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation: Comparative Constitu-
tionalism & Chinese Characteristics, 3 H.K. L.J. 200 (2001).
130. Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. President of
the Legislative Council, supra note 119.
131. Id. ¶ 120.
132. Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. President of
the Legislative Council, [2017] 1 HLRD 460, ¶ 42 (C.A).
133. Id. ¶ 28.
134. Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. President of
the Legislative Council, [2017] FAMV 7²10/2017, ¶ 35 (C.F.A.).
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Buoyed by this success, the Government subsequently began
similar actions against Lau Siu-lai, Edward Yiu Chung-yim, Na-
than Law Kwun-chung, and Leung Kwok-hung, all of whom
were subsequently disqualified.
135
In July of 2018, the Govern-
ment announced it would take steps to formally ban the Hong
Kong National Party entirely, preventing it from continuing op-
erations.
136
The mechanism for banning the National Party was
the application of the Societies Ordinances, Article 8, which al-
lows the Secretary for Security to prohibit the operation of any
organization if the Secretary believes it is necessary in the “in-
terests of national security, public safety, or public order.”
137
Though the National Party is perhaps the most extreme of the
localist groups in explicitly calling for abolishment of the Basic
Law and formation of a Republic of Hong Kong, the use of the
Societies Ordinance to ban a political party³none of whose
members have been charged with committing a crime³is re-
markable. It harkens back to the colonial era,
138
when the Ordi-
nance was used to restrict the operation of communist organiza-
tions.
135. Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Nathan Law
Kwun Chung, [2016] HCAL 223/2016 (C.F.I.), Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special
Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Leung Kwok Hung, [2016] HCAL 224/2016 (C.F.I.),
Chief Executive of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Lau Siu Lai,
[2016] HCAL 225/2016 (C.F.I.), Chief Executive of the H.K. Special Admin. Re-
gion (HKSAR) v. Yiu Chung Yim, [2016] HCAL 226/2016 (C.F.I.) (all heard
together, again in front of Au J). Leung Kwok Hung appealed, unsuccessfully:
Chief Exec. of the H.K. Special Admin. Region (HKSAR) v. Leung Kwok Hung,
[2019] HKCA 173. Yiu later ran in a by-election for another seat, though he
lost. Given his earlier disqualification and the government’s attempts to bar
certain candidates, it was not initially clear if he would be allowed to stand for
office again; however, the election authorities approved his candidacy after he
stated that he would sincerely uphold the Basic Law and that he had accepted
the legitimacy of his earlier disqualification. See Tony Cheung & Jeffie Lam,
Hong Kong Democracy Activist Edward Yiu Cleared to Run in Legco By-Elec-
tion, S. CHINAMORNINGPOST (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/politics/article/2131043/hong-kong-democracy-activist-edward-yiu-
cleared-run-legco.
136. Jeffie Lam, Hong Kong Separatist Political Party Faces Landmark Gov-
ernment Ban in the Name of National Security, S. CHINAMORNING POST (July
17, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/arti-
cle/2155566/hong-kong-separatist-political-party-faces-landmark.
137. Societies Ordinance, (2018) Cap. 151, 24 § 8 (H.K.).
138. Until the events described in this article, the Societies Ordinance had
only been used post 1997 to combat organized crime groups (also known as
¶Triads’).
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Actions against localist councillors or those who may have lo-
calist sympathies continue in other forms. For example, another
individual was charged with desecrating the national flag after
turning upside down a number of small PRC flags that pro-Bei-
jing councillors had kept on their desks in the legislature. He
was convicted, fined 5000 HKD, or about $650 USD, and was
subsequently fired from his adjunct professor job at a local uni-
versity.
139
Though he did not suffer any penalty as a legislative
councillor per se, there were clear impacts on his personal and
professional life in other contexts. Indeed, the possible risk of
being associated with the localist cause is a central element of
the message that is intended to be conveyed, and it comes from
a wide range of public bodies and establishment interests. The
police have begun using an expansive interpretation of the
Crimes Ordinance and a relatively weak regime governing police
access to user data to request removal of certain kinds of content
online. I have argued elsewhere that this can allow political con-
siderations to inappropriately enter into policing decisions and
have chilling effects on political speech online.
140
In 2016 the Ed-
ucation Bureau warned secondary school teachers that they
could be fired if they talked about independence in the class-
room.
141
Universities were not immune from the controversy.
Following protests on several campuses and conflicts between
different groups of students, in 2017 the vice-chancellors of the
local universities issued a joint statement stating that their in-
stitutions were places for learning rather than political protest,
that free speech had limits, and that independence for Hong
Kong “contravened” the Basic Law.
142
The same year, the Food
139. Joyce Ng & Christy Leung, Localist Hong Kong Lawmaker Faces
Charges for Turning Flags Upside Down in Legco Chamber, S. CHINAMORNING
POST (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/arti-
cle/2086445/localist-hong-kong-lawmaker-faces-charges-turning-flags.
140. See Stuart Hargreaves, Online Monitoring of ‘Localists’ in Hong Kong:
A Return to Political Policing?, 15 SURVEILLANCE& SOC’Y 425 (2017).
141. Ernest Kao, Hong Kong Teachers Warned They Could Be Struck Off For
Separatist Talk in Schools, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 14 2016),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2003782/hong-kong-
teachers-warned-they-could-be-struck-separatist.
142. Shirley Zhao & Peace Chiu, Students Vow to Camp Out and Protect
Hong Kong Independence Banners After Removal Threat, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-com-
munity/article/2111365/let-hong-kong-universities-not-government-deal. Pe-
ter Mathieson (formerly Vice-Chancellor of HKU) subsequently back-tracked
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and Environmental Hygiene Department denied a number of lo-
calist parties licenses to set up stalls at a Lunar New Year.
143
The justification offered by the Department was that it was nec-
essary to avoid the threat of disruption to public order due to
their controversial views. In 2018, a British journalist who had
chaired a talk by the leader of the Hong Kong National Party at
the Foreign Correspondent’s Club found that a renewal of his





there was a link between the talk and the
visa, it was interpreted by many as an attack on press free-
dom.
146
Pushback could also be felt from the financial sector³a domi-
nant player in Hong Kong, which styles itself as a free-market
hub. Though banks are not, of course, public bodies, they are
nonetheless very much part of the establishment and appeared
willing to follow the Government’s lead in this area. Localist par-
ties encountered seemingly coordinated difficulties in setting up
bank accounts into which they could receive donations,
147
while
after he took up a new position in Scotland. See Tom Peterkin, Hong Kong In-
dependence Row Dogs Edinburgh Uni’s Incoming Principal, SCOTSMAN (Sept.
24, 2017), https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/hong-kong-independence-
row-dogs-edinburgh-uni-s-incoming-principal-1-4568302.
143. Danny Mok, Youngspiration and HKNP Barred From Operating Stalls
at Hong Kong’s Largest Lunar New Year Fair, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan.
19, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/arti-
cle/2063479/youngspiration-and-hknp-barred-operating-stalls-hong-kongs.
144. Jeffie Lam, Tony Cheung, & Sum Lok-kei, Backlash as Hong Kong De-
nies Visa Renewal for Financial Times Journalist Victor Mallet, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/poli-
tics/article/2167149/hong-kong-denies-visa-renewal-foreign-journalist-who-
chaired.
145. Tony Cheung & SumLok-kei, I Will Defend Press Freedom but Not Allow
Advocacy of Hong Kong Independence, City Leader Carrie Lam Says Amid Row
Over Visa for British Financial Times Journalist, S. CHINAMORNINGPOST (Oct.
9, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2167599/i-
will-defend-press-freedom-not-allow-advocacy-hong-kong.
146. Alvin Lum, Hong Kong’s Denial of Work Visa for Journalist Victor Mal-
let Sends ‘Chilling Message’ About Erosion of Basic Rights, Financial Times
Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2167391/hong-kongs-
denial-work-visa-journalist-victor-mallet-sends.
147. HSBC Accused of Censorship for Refusing Hong Kong Student Leader’s
Account, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2016/apr/06/hsbc-accused-of-censorship-for-refusing-hong-
kong-student-leaders-account.
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the Bank of China and HSBC closed or froze the accounts of
some of the disbarred councillors.
148
These actions are consistent
with the attitude of much of the financial sector towards demo-
cratic agitation in general, which is deemed to be a threat to
Hong Kong’s stability and, thus, profitability.
149
IV. IS LOCALISMUNCONSTITUTIONAL?
All these maneuvers³from efforts to bar political candidates
from running for office to the dissuasion of political protest on
university campuses³were justified by the Government on the
ground that localism is per se unconstitutional. The Basic Law
states that Hong Kong is an “inalienable” part of the PRC
150
, and
that it is a “local administrative region” of the PRC that comes
directly under the authority of the CPG.
151
To use these provi-
sions to ground a broad claim that localist speech is automati-
cally “unconstitutional” is, however, misleading for a number of
reasons. First, it ignores that most variants of localism, as this
article has noted, do not call for outright independence.
152
In-
deed, the majority of localists simply seek to protect the “high
degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong within the PRC that both
Article 2 and Article 12 of the Basic Law promise.
153
The dispute
most localists have with the Government is simply over what
that autonomy under OCTS entails. Autonomy is necessarily a
contested concept, and it stretches credulity in a liberal-demo-
cratic system (or even a quasi-liberal democratic one like Hong
148. Kris Cheng, Bank of China Closes Account of Localist Youngspiration
Party as HSBC Freezes That of Ousted Lawmaker, H.K. FREE PRESS (Feb. 20,
2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/02/20/bank-china-closes-account-lo-
calist-youngspiration-party-hsbc-freezes-ousted-lawmaker/.
149. See, e.g., Gary Cheung, Business Chambers Condemn Occupy Central in
Newspaper Ads, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 12, 2014),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529895/business-chambers-
condemn-occupy-central-newspaper-ads.
150. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
151. Id. art. 12.
152. The Hong Kong National Party and its stated policy goal of abolishment
of the Basic Law is the notable outlier here.
153. Section 40 of the Legislative Council Ordinance requires, inter alia, that
a candidate declare that they will uphold the Basic Law; as currently being
implemented by the EOC it seems unlikely that any candidate will be allowed
to run on a platform pledging to abolish the Basic Law. Whether or not § 40
could actually withstand a constitutional challenge now that it is being used to
ensure a substantive political belief requirement, is another matter, however.
Legislative Council Ordinance, supra note 98, § 40.
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Kong) to say that the government can a priori determine which
particular understanding is acceptable and which is not as mat-
ter of public policy and law. More importantly, however, this po-
sition fundamentally misstates the way the Basic Law operates
which, as with many constitutions, is essentially vertical: it de-
fines the structure of the state (or in this case, the Special Ad-
ministrative Region), the values to which it is committed, and
the limits within which it must operate, given that structure and
those values. The rights under the Basic Law are thus struc-
tured in a negative sense; they prevent the Government from
encroaching upon enumerated freedoms, rather than creating
obligations upon individuals.
This is why the Government must use subsidiary legislation to
give effect to even those elements of the Basic Law the text of
which might otherwise suggest the existence of positive individ-
ual obligations. Consider, for instance, the requirement created
under Article 104 of the Basic Law for Government officials to
take an oath of office. Although this requirement might appear
to directly create an obligation, the obligation is actually given
effect through the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance. While Ar-
ticle 104 refers to the need for the Chief Executive and other
principal officials to take certain oaths, it states they must do so
“in accordance with law.” The correct understanding of Article
104, then, is that it requires the Government implement subsid-
iary legislation to give it effect, and indeed, this is precisely what
the Government has done through the relevant ordinances. Re-
call that it was not Article 104 that was held by the courts in the
oath-taking case to have independent effect; rather it was only
the NPCSC Interpretation of it that could, in the Chinese style,
effectively act as a legislative supplement (and thus create an
obligation). This principle explains why even though the prohi-
bition on desecration of the national flag comes from the incor-
poration of the relevant National Law into Annex III of the Basic
Law, it is nonetheless still implemented through a subsidiary
law.
154
Those who deface the national flag are charged not with
violating an element of the Basic Law, but instead the National
Flag Ordinance.
The vertical operation of the Basic Law means it would be lu-
dicrous to suggest that a private book publisher who refused to
publish books that contained certain political viewpoints would
154. National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance, supra note 46.
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be acting ¶unconstitutionally’. It means only that if the Govern-
ment prohibited the publication of certain kinds of political ma-
terials, then that prohibition would almost certainly be contrary
to the speech rights contained in Basic Law.
155
In short, the
Basic Law does not create direct obligations on individuals; ra-
ther, it creates a political system and a set of rules and values
that the Government must respect and abide by.
Under a vertical account of the Basic Law there is nothing in-
compatible between advocating for a particular interpretation of
autonomy within the OCTS model and upholding the Basic Law.
Indeed, to argue and debate and advocate for certain policy po-
sitions regarding vital political questions is the very function of
a legislative councillor. It is not even contrary to the Basic Law
to advocate that the Basic Law should be changed: Article 159
conceives that it may be amended and that the Legislative Coun-
cil has a role to play in proposing such amendments. Now, it is
true that Article 159(4) also holds that no such amendment can
contravene the “basic policies” of the PRC regarding Hong Kong;
those policies are elaborated in Annex I to the Joint Declaration,
and essentially form a rough draft of the Basic Law itself. There
is nothing, however, to suggest that those policies are set in
stone.
156
The PRC itself has amended its own constitution in
very significant ways on multiple occasions since 1955.
157
It
would make no sense to argue that the PRC can amend its own
constitution, but not its internal policies. The PRC itself has ar-
155. The Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 27. The Government is free, of course,
to defend the constitutionality of its laws or actions in court, and there is a
great deal of jurisprudence detailing how the Government may justify re-
strictions on rights contained in the Basic Law. See for instance Chan & Lim,
supra note 15, 569²619.
156. Thus, no matter how odd it may sound, conceptually speaking the Hong
Kong National Party’s demand for abolishment of the Basic Law is not neces-
sarily ¶contrary’ to the Basic Law, absent subsidiary legislation.
157. Significant structural changes were introduced in 1954, 1975, 1978, and
1982; smaller changes were made in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2018. For
amendments pre-2018, see QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2012). For the 2018 amendments, see Translation:
2018 Amendment to the PRC Constitution, NPC OBSERVER (Mar. 11, 2018),
https://npcobserver.com/2018/03/11/translation-2018-amendment-to-the-p-r-c-
constitution/.
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gued that the Joint Declaration is an exhausted legal instru-
ment, having fulfilled its purpose on July 1, 1997, and has sug-
gested it believes those basic policies may be altered.
158
It is absolutely true that a declaration of independence by the
HongKongGovernment would violate Article 1 of the Basic Law.
There is no question that such a declaration would be unconsti-
tutional and have no force or effect, short of a complete collapse
of the existing legal order. The corollary, however, is that it is
not true that localist speech by individuals is automatically a
constitutional violation because individuals are not directly
bound by the content of Article 1. Yet, that is the impression the
Government has tried to create. Should it wish to limit certain
kinds of political speech, the Government must pass a clear leg-
islative instrument to do so and be willing to have the constitu-
tional validity of that instrument tested in the courts.
V. CAN LOCALIST SPEECH BE BANNED?
Not all jurisdictions agree on the proper limits of speech, of
course. Though hate speech laws in Europe naturally come into
conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights free
expression guarantee,
159
the ECtHR has nonetheless generally
found such laws to pass constitutional muster.
160
Canada’s hate
speech laws were also challenged as a violation of the free ex-
pression guarantee under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,
161
they were ultimately deemed constitutionally valid
by the Supreme Court of Canada as a limit that was “demonstra-
bly justifiable in a free and democratic society.”
162
In contrast,
the courts of the United States have found that hate speech laws
158. China Says Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong No Longer Has
Meaning, REUTERS (June 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
hongkong-anniversary-china/china-says-sino-british-joint-declaration-on-
hong-kong-no-longer-has-meaning-idUSKBN19L1J1.
159. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
160. See, e.g., Kühnen v. Germany, App. No. 12194/86 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.
May 12, 1988); Lehideux v. France, App. No. 24662/94, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
2887; Garaudy v. France, App. No. 65831/01, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 803 [here-
inafter Garaudy].
161. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c 11,
§ 2(b) (U.K.).
162. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
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do not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
163
However, while the
outcomes of challenges to limits on speech are not necessarily
the same across jurisdictions, what is consistent is that the lim-
its are legislated clearly before being subject to constitutional
scrutiny by an independent judiciary. The Hong Kong Govern-
ment has assuredly not, however, done this in its attempts to
limit or contain what it sees as harmful political speech. Instead,
as this article has shown, it has engaged in collateral attacks
against it. This approach is inconsistent with the way in which
rights may be limited under the Basic Law. But what would be
a valid approach?
The first step would of course be drafting a law with sufficient
precision to meet the ¶prescribed by law’ standard, perhaps for-
bidding the public avocation (orally or in writing) of the separa-
tion of Hong Kong from the rest of China. One might reasonably
expect that such a law would immediately be challenged in the
courts. A court applying the proportionality test would first (as-
suming the law is indeed sufficiently precise) ask if there were a
legitimate aim to the limitation. As noted, the jurisprudence in
Hong Kong considers that the only valid aims in restricting the
speech right to be those found within the text of the ICCPR.
164
It
seems likely that the Government would try and justify a hypo-
thetical law as necessary in the interests of national security or
public order (ordre public). Indeed at least one commentator ar-
guing in favour of a law banning localist speech tried to make
the national security claim through analogy to Holocaust denial
laws: the argument goes that such laws are intimately tied to
the lived history of certain places, and the lived history of China
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was one of repeated
163. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The maximalist ap-
proach to speech in the United States also led to a very different outcome than
in Hong Kong regarding a flag desecration law. The burning of the U.S. flag
was a commonplace form of protest during the Vietnam War, and Congress
attempted to criminalize it in 1968 (18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968)). In 1989, the Su-
preme Court found this law to violate the First Amendment, concluding that
burning the flag was expressive conduct and the Government could not justify
regulating such conduct that fell short of immediate incitement. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Congress immediately sought to pass a new law
that attempted to skirt the Court’s decision by banning any ¶mistreatment’ of
the flag without regard to purpose, but this too was deemed unconstitutional
on the same grounds. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
164. See supra note 55.
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territorial incursions from hostile foreign states.
165
As a result,
goes the argument, Hong Kong has a legitimate justification in
banning any speech that might threaten the sovereignty or ter-
ritorial integrity of the PRC.
166
The analogy rings hollow, how-
ever. It is true that, reflecting the atrocities of the twentieth cen-
tury, a number of European nations, as well as Israel, specifi-
cally forbid the public approval or denial³both orally or in writ-
ing³of the Holocaust.
167
Those laws, however, are connected to
preventing the reoccurrence of a historical genocide targeted at
members of particular classes. Preventing incitement to violence
is therefore a critical justification: “Denial can often be mixed
with other, more direct, methods of incitement capable of con-
cocting potent verbal cocktails that foment violence against vic-
tim groups.”
168
In judging the legitimacy of Holocaust denial
laws, the ECtHR “takes into account context and the actual like-
lihood of violence when judging a speech restriction,”
169
and also
considers that “denying crimes against humanity is [itself] a
form of racial defamation [and thus] incitement.”
170
Without a
proper anchor to security concerns, there is a risk that public
denial laws can be improperly deployed to repress legitimate dis-
sent. Allen and Norris show that this has been the case in
165. Tony Cheung, Ban Advocacy of Hong Kong Independence, Beijing




167. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 94, § 130(3²5); Ustawy o Instytucie
Pamičci Narodowej [Act on the Institute of National Remembrance] (1998 r.
DZ. U. 1998 Nr 155, poz. 1016) (Pol.); Loi tendant à réprimer la négation, la
minimisation, la justification ou l’approbation du génocide commis par le ré-
gime national-socialiste allemand pendant la seconde guerre mondiale [Act on
Punishing the Denial, Minimization, Justification or Approval of the Genocide
Perpetrated by the German National Socialist Regime During the Second
World War] of Mar. 23, 1995, MONTIEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Bel-
gium], Mar. 30, 1995, 7996; Denial of Holocaust (Prohibition) Law, 5746²1986,
§2²4 (1986) (Isr.).
168. GREGORY GORDON, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION,
FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION 418 (2017).
169. Id. at 164.
170. Garaudy, supra note 160.
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Rwanda, for instance.
171
For this reason, the Johannesburg Prin-
ciples
172
seek to connect the national security justification to im-
minent violence. They hold that restricting speech (other than
preventing the disclosure of state secrets or other protected in-
formation)
173
under the guise of national security requires a gov-
ernment to demonstrate that: (a) the expression is intended to
incite imminent violence; (b) it is likely to incite such violence;
and (c) there is a direct and immediate connection between the
expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.”
174
Moreover, the Johannesburg Principles specifically note that the
following forms of expression should not be considered a threat
to national security:
(i) [that which] advocates non-violent change of government
policy or the government itself; [or]
(ii) [that which] constitutes criticism of, or insult to, the na-
tion, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or
public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, govern-
ment, agencies or public officials. . . .
175
Localist speech is undoubtedly a thorn in the side of the Gov-
ernment, but it is much less clear that such speech poses an ac-
tual threat to national security on these grounds. There is no
evidence that localist speech is part of a plan to destabilize the
region or the PRC by hostile foreign actors. It does not incite ha-
tred or risk of violence against any particular person, let alone
171. Jennifer M. Allen & George H. Norris, Is Genocide Different? Dealing
with Hate Speech in a Post-Genocide Society, 7 J. INT’L L. & INT’LREL. 146, 158
(2011).
172. The Johannesburg Principles were adopted in 1995 and are based on
regional and international law and standards relating to the protection of
rights under Article 19 of the ICCPR. See ARTICLE 19, JOHANNESBURG
PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION (1996), available at https://www.article19.org/resources/johan-
nesburg-principles-on-national-security-freedom-of-expression-and-access-to-
information/.
173. Id. princ. 15. Preventing the release of ¶state secrets’ was the traditional
aim of limiting speech rights in the name of ¶national security,’ and is common
to even the most maximalist speech regimes. See, e.g., Thomas M. Frank &
James J. Eisen, Balancing National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U J.
INT’LL.&POL. 339 (1982); David L. Sobel, Free Speech & National Security, 20
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 5 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Secu-
rity, 84 IND. L. J. 369 (2009).
174. ARTICLE 19, supra note 172, princ. 6.
175. Id. princ. 7.
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all members of an identifiable class. The actual threat to the in-
tegrity of the state seems minimal. Though the Johannesburg
Principles are not binding, there is no clear national security jus-
tification for limiting speech in the case of localists. Given the
holding in Ng Kung Siu, its treatment of political context, and
the current Chief Justice’s views on the matter as expounded in
Koo Sze Yiu, however, it seems much more likely that the Court
would accept public order (ordre public) as a legitimate aim of a
hypothetical law that sought to regulate localist speech: it would
appear to be relatively straightforward to make the same argu-
ments about the reinforcement of societal stability under the
OCTS model being a legitimate aim in the context of separatist
speech as was made in the flag cases. The more difficult chal-
lenge for the Government in this scenario would be meeting the
¶rational connection’ and ¶minimal impairment elements of the
proportionality test.
176
Could there be a rational connection between a hypothetical
law restricting localist speech and the goal of protecting national
stability? This author suggests no, since where such speech does
actually pose serious threats to public order or to stability gen-
erally there are already suitable laws in place. For instance, the
Public Order Ordinance can already be used to prohibit political
demonstrations that are likely to lead to breach of the peace (this
limitation has survived constitutional scrutiny).
177
In terms of
overall social or national stability, the Crimes Ordinance al-
ready contains provisions dealing with sedition: it is an offence
to “excite [the] inhabitants of Hong Kong to attempt to procure
the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other
176. The new fourth step of the test under Hysan Development Co. Ltd., su-
pra note 52, does not seem relevant here, as it seeks to insert consideration of
the actual deleterious effects on an individual of the impugned rights limita-
tion even if the Government has made out its case under the other steps of the
test. Since I have argued that it is impossible for the Government to meet its
burden under the rational connection and minimal impairment steps, there is
no need to consider the fourth step in the analysis.
177. Public Order Ordinance, (2017) Cap. 245 (H.K.). In Leung Kwok Hung,
supra note 74, the CFA found that the requirement that protestors obtain in
advance from the Police provide a letter of ¶no objection’ was acceptable, though
the grounds upon which the Police could deny to provide such a letter were
limited. The Court severed ordre public as reason for denial from the scheme,
though it agreed that the police could object to a proposed march for the more
straightforward public order reasons.
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matter in Hong Kong as by law established; incite persons to vi-
olence; or counsel disobedience to law or to any lawful order.”
178
These provisions mean that any actions by localists to foment
actual revolution against the sovereign or to agitate for the
breakdown of the legal order through violence are already pro-
hibited by Hong Kong law; no new speech limits are required to
criminalize such activities.
179
Proving that a law regulating the
actual content of certain types of political speech is rationally
connected to protecting public order or general stability of the
community would be a significant legal hurdle for the Govern-
ment to clear at this stage of the legal analysis.
Assuming that the Government did meet that challenge, how-
ever, the question would then turn to that of impairment, and it
is here that a law that sought to tightly regulate the expression
of localist sentiment would almost certainly founder. Though it
is true that the Government is granted a margin of discretion in
its policy choices in achieving its goals, the Court will give much
less leeway to the Government where core rights are at issue:
It is convenient here also to remind ourselves that where the
subject matter of the challenge has to do with fundamental con-
cepts, in contradistinction to rights associated with purely so-
cial and economic policies, the courts will be particularly vigi-
lant to protect the rights associated with such concepts, and
consequently much less leeway or margin of appreciation will
be accorded to the authority concerned. These fundamental
concepts are those which go to the heart of any society. They
178. Crimes Ordinance, (2017) Cap. 200, § 9(1)(b, f, g) (H.K.).
179. The vast majority of self-described localists seek to do none of this, of
course. They argue only for a particular understanding of the autonomy prom-
ised to Hong Kong under the Basic Law. The overwhelming majority of people
in Hong Kong, including the vast majority of self-described localists, recognize
the sovereign claims of the PRC over the Region and accept the OCTS model.
There is also a long history in the common law world of using sedition laws to
supress unpopular political views, leading to some calls for abolishment. Lib-
eralization during the twentieth century led them to falling into disuse in
many jurisdictions, with some calling for their formal abolishment. Only the
¶war on terror’ appeared to revive interest in using sedition laws to deal with
those who would incite violence in others purely through speech. See Laura K.
Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 233, 262 (2005); Laurence W. Maher, The Use and Abuse of Sedition, 14
SYDNEY L. REV. 287 (1992); Geoffrey Palmer, Political Speech and Sedition, 11
Y.B.N.Z. JURIS. 36 (2008²2009); SARAH SORIAL, SEDITION AND THEADVOCACY OF
VIOLENCE: FREE SPEECH AND COUNTER-TERRORISM (2011).
710 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:2
include, for example, the right to life, the right not to be tor-
tured, the right not to be held in slavery, the freedom of expres-
sion and opinion, freedom of religion (among others).
180
It seems unlikely that a law aimed at the general restriction
of localist sentiment in public would meet the minimum impair-
ment threshold, particularly if the Government fails to draw dis-
tinctions between the various strains of localist advocacy. A ban
on localist speech would necessarily have to be aimed at the very
substance of the ideas contained within it, rather than use of
those ideas to foment unrest since, as indicated, laws already
exist to combat that problem. This means that justifying a total
ban on localist avocation would require the CFA to entirely over-
turn its prior free speech jurisprudence, throwing out the sub-
stance versus mode question. Giving validity to such a lawwould
gut the very essence of Hong Kong residents’ rights and free-
doms under the OCTS model, under which the benefits of a ro-
bust political exchange of views remain even in its challenging
atmosphere. Per Li CJ in Ng Kung Siu,
Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom in a demo-
cratic society. It lies at the heart of civil society and of Hong
Kong’s system and way of life. The courts must give a generous
interpretation to its constitutional guarantee. This freedom in-
cludes the freedom to express ideas which the majority may
find disagreeable or offensive and the freedom to criticise gov-
ernmental institutions and the conduct of public officials.
181
A law that sought to prohibit localist discourse in general
would require the Court to completely disregard not only its pre-
vious jurisprudence, but also the fundamental core of the free
expression guarantee. There is no doubt that the majority of
Hong Kongers find the localist position pointless, disagreeable,
uncomfortable, offensive, or even harmful. The Basic Law, how-
ever, clearly protects the rights of Hong Kongers to hold such
positions; rights are not and cannot be subject to the desires of
the majority. Political speech of all kinds is inherently beneficial
in a democratic society. As John Stuart Mill argued,
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the ex-
isting generation; those who dissent from the opinion; still
180. Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A. 409, ¶ 79 (C.F.A.).
181. Ng Kung Siu, supra note 35, ¶ 41.
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more those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived
of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they
lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.
182
Given the challenges outlined above, it is more likely that the
Government would pass a law limiting a specific class of political
speech and then seek to rely upon a helpful Interpretation from
the NPCSC to ensure its constitutional survival. The NPCSC is
not, as noted, bound by common law modes of constitutional in-
terpretation when exercising its powers under Article 158. It
could, therefore, interpret Article 39 and/or Article 27 of the
Basic Law so as to explicitly specify that each is limited by the
content of Article 1. In turn, this would provide constitutional
cover for any subsidiary law that sought to ban the substance of
pro-localist speech made in public, eliminating the need for CFA
approval. Such a radical move, however, would no doubt inflame
political tensions. Though localists hold a fringe political posi-
tion, general uneasiness about the gradual erosion of the OCTS
model is more widespread; indeed, it is a longstanding con-
cern.
183
Though there was a large gap between the controversial
Interpretations of 1999 and 2016, it is not clear that the public
would tolerate another in short order, particularly if it is popu-
larly understood to be a mechanism for the Government to con-
duct an end-run around civil liberties. An Interpretation by the
Standing Committee designed to save a law that sought to limit
182. JOHN STUARTMILL, ON LIBERTY 19 (Batoche Books Ltd. 2001) (1859).
183. The largest street protests Hong Kong has ever seen came in 2003 when
the Government attempted to implement national security legislation that was
seen by the public as being an overbroad, draconian crackdown on civil liber-
ties. Over half a million people³nearly 10 percent of the entire population³
participated in street protests, leading to the bill’s withdrawal and various po-
litical figures to resign. See Albert H.Y. Chen, Will Our Civil Liberties Survive
the Implementation of Article 23?, H.K. LAW. 80, 81²86 (2002); Tom Kellogg,
Legislating Rights: Basic Law Article 23, National Security, and Human
Rights in Hong Kong, 17 COLUM. J. ASIANL. 307, 308 (2003); Carol J. Peterson,
National Security Offences and Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: A Critique of the
Government’s Consultation on Art. 23, 32 H.K. L.J. 457, 468 (2002). Likewise,
an initially aggressive crackdown by police on student protestors during Oc-
cupy Central also proved counterproductive, bringing many onto the streets in
sympathy rather than out of strong political conviction for the goals. See Har-
greaves, supra note 17.
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certain kinds of political speech related to the relationship be-
tween Hong Kong and the mainland would likely be viewed by a
large part of the population as a troubling erosion of the rights
promised to them under the Basic Law. Even though the over-
whelming majority of Hong Kongers disagree with the localist
position, a draconian crackdown on speech rights might create
blowback from moderates.
CONCLUSION
The Government of Hong Kong is faced with a number of
choices in dealing with localist speech; it may find none of them
to be ideal. Such is the reality of governing a complicated place
in a complicated time. This article has suggested that though the
Government may attempt to legislate restrictions on certain po-
litical speech, the CFA is unlikely to find that such a law com-
ports with the Basic Law. The Government could wait for the
NPCSC to issue an Interpretation that would circumvent this
problem. Yet that is likely to provoke further political trouble.
The Government could continue its method of batting down lo-
calists where they can through other methods, justifying a range
of actions by creating a false impression in the minds of the pub-
lic that the Basic Law automatically makes certain kinds of po-
litical speech unconstitutional. This, however, grinds down the
edges of the political speech right in Hong Kong in a fashion that
is inconsistent with the ideals laid out in the Joint Declaration
of 1984 and in the Basic Law itself. The fourth choice³and most
sensible, in this author’s view³is to openly tolerate localist
speech and to treat it is as the minor annoyance it is. That does
not mean blindly approving of localist speech, nor does it mean
shying away from intense criticism of such speech in the course
of political dialogue. The only true way to combat localism is to
prove to Hong Kongers that it is unnecessary³that their rights
and freedoms and way of life are protected through the Basic
Law, and that the OCTS commitment to the autonomy of Hong
Kong under the sovereignty of the PRC remains the guiding
principle. Tolerating unwelcome political speech serves precisely
this goal. While the Government may believe itself to be acting
rationally for the reasons this article has outlined (or may have
effectively no choice in the matter³a separate issue), in the long
run, its current approach to the suppression of unwelcome polit-
ical speech is a deeply dangerous trend. If vital constitutional
rights can be eroded outside the framework contemplated by the
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constitution in the name of political necessity, then the entire
foundation of the OCTS model is threatened.
